Advanced
Error loading page.
Try refreshing the page. If that doesn't work, there may be a network issue, and you can use our self test page to see what's preventing the page from loading.
Learn more about possible network issues or contact support for more help.
Title details for Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box by Masaaki Higashijima - Available

Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box

by Masaaki Higashijima
ebook
Read a sample Read a sample

Contrary to our stereotypical views, dictators often introduce elections in which they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud. Why do electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box argues that strong autocrats who can garner popular support become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, elections backfire in the form of coups, protests, and the opposition's stunning election victories. The book's theoretical implications are tested on a battery of cross-national analyses with newly collected data on autocratic elections and in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Expand title description text
Series: Emerging Democracies Publisher: University of Michigan Press

OverDrive Read

  • ISBN: 9780472220083
  • Release date: June 7, 2022

EPUB ebook

  • ISBN: 9780472220083
  • File size: 4947 KB
  • Release date: June 7, 2022

Open EPUB ebook

  • ISBN: 9780472902750
  • File size: 4942 KB
  • Release date: June 7, 2022

Formats

OverDrive Read
EPUB ebook
Open EPUB ebook

subjects

Politics Nonfiction

Languages

English

Contrary to our stereotypical views, dictators often introduce elections in which they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud. Why do electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box argues that strong autocrats who can garner popular support become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, elections backfire in the form of coups, protests, and the opposition's stunning election victories. The book's theoretical implications are tested on a battery of cross-national analyses with newly collected data on autocratic elections and in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Expand title description text
Politics Nonfiction